

## **Boko Haram Repentance and the Philosophy of De-radicalization in Nigeria**

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### **Abstract**

The philosophy underpinning de-radicalization is the idea that social and psychological processes in which an individual's commitment to and involvement in violent radicalization are decreased to the point that they are no longer at risk of participation and engagement in violent activity. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to investigate the philosophy and de-radicalization of Boko Haram in Nigeria. This study is anchored on frustration-aggression model theory. The study adopted a survey research design, and data used in this study was collected through a structured questionnaire. The study population comprises male and female repentants of the Boko Haram sect who are undergoing de-radicalization programmes. The non-probability sampling technique was adopted in this study. The study concluded that the process of de-radicalization which has not been fully harnessed is forgiveness and acceptances of the repentant members of the sect by members of the communities that they are going to be reintegrated into. The study suggests that there is a need for greater involvement of people in the communities in the de-radicalization process.

**Keywords:** Boko Haram, Repentance, De-radicalization, Nigeria, Terrorism.

### **Introduction**

Terrorism is defined as an act of violence (domestic or international), committed against both state and non-state actors, and aimed to achieve behavioural change and political objectives by creating fear in a larger population. A key means through which ideas that promote acts of terrorism is disseminated is the indoctrination of extreme views that are meant to make initiates think that the only way to change a political system is through a radical and violent change of the status quo (Corner & Gill, 2014). Precisely, radicalization can be defined as a process through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioural change and political goals (Koehler, 2016).

However, the philosophy of de-radicalization means the ideas, principles and values that should underpin any serious attempt or exercise to de-radicalize, essentially countering the violent behaviour of the person to be de-radicalized (Horgan, 2009). The philosophy underpinning de-radicalization is the in the idea that social and psychological process in which an individual's commitment to and involvement in violent radicalization are decreased to the point that they are no longer at risk of participation and engagement in violent activity (Moghaddam, Heckenlaible, Blackman, Fasano & Dufour, 2016). Additionally, the philosophy of de-radicalization can also be explained as a process in which people reject the ideology they once embraced (Onah, 2014). This is one step further than disengagement, which is characterized by a change in behaviour which portends stoppage in the use of violence and leaving the radical group, without giving up one's radical beliefs. However, the philosophy of de-radicalization is based on the need to totally change the minds of extremists from their parochial radical focus to a more pragmatic and positive focus about the state and the society.

There are three stages involved in the process of de-radicalization, and these include the micro, meso and macro levels (Corner & Gill, 2014). A factor at the micro level can be the loss of the ideological appeal. By experiencing other major life events such as marriage, birth of a child-which may strengthen other group ties. As a result, the radical group may offer less significance and meaning. At the meso level, a critical factor is intellectual doubt which is about fighter having a rethink about what they have been doing and wanting to

change for better, which sometimes is heightened by exposure to alternative viewpoints, such as through relevant books and media, but it may also be supported by other group members. Another important element at the meso level is detachment from the group and its activities, sometimes caused by an intra- group conflict and disappointment in the (leaders of the) group (Feddes, Mann & Doosje, 2013). At the macro level, prison can sometimes create a context in which people want to make a new start and de-radicalize (Mercy Corps, 2016).

### **Purpose and Objectives**

The purpose of this study is to investigate Boko Haram repentance and the philosophy of de-radicalization in Nigeria.

However, the specific objectives of this study are to:

- i. Clarify the philosophy of de-radicalization
- ii. Examine the acceptance of the philosophy of de-radicalization of repentant Boko Haram terrorists by the society
- iii. Determine the effect of de-radicalization on the threat of radicalization in Nigeria

### **Literature Review**

#### **De-radicalization**

De-radicalization is one of the major components of counterterrorism interventions that are being implemented in several places across the globe. It is a process that can only be applied to individuals or groups after radicalization has occurred (Yaza & Ahmad, 2021). Although no one standard definition of De-radicalization exists, it was defined as a process of abandoning an extremist world view and concluding it is not acceptable to use violence as a means of achieving one's aims (Batool, Rizwan, & Ullah, 2021). The debatable fact is what makes one a radical in the view of others. To some, radicalization leading to violent extremism is what worries the society most. The International Peace Institute (IPI), USA defines it as programs which are geared toward peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism (Mat, 2020).

Additionally, it is a process of divorcing a person, voluntarily or otherwise, from their extreme views. According to the IPI, de-radicalization, rather than focus only on violent extremists, could be focused according to the need of governments on prisoners, potential terrorists, convicted criminals, repentant extremists etc. (Mat, 2020). Therefore, by IPI's definition, the focus is mainly on extremism (views), while the process comes with various components. That makes their position unclear and ambiguous to understand. Since radicals are in various forms, each de-radicalization process should correspond with what it affects. For example, if someone got radicalized based on ideologies, it needs to be ascertained whether or not such ideologies are positive or negative or if such ideologies go against laws of where such a person resides or not. It does not make sense to put someone that got radicalized and led to violent extremism into the same process of de-radicalization with someone that got radicalized to fight for independence of his nation.

In one of the German perspectives, the Task Force on Gendered Right-Wing Extremism Prevention (TFGRWEP) asserted that de-radicalization means the individual or collective change from a criminal, ideologically radical or extremist identity to one that is noncriminal or moderate (The Task Force on Gendered Right-Wing Extremism Prevention (TFGRWEP), 2016). Such an assertion is conflicting because it could be seen in two ways: changing from criminal ideological or extremist ideology to non-criminal or moderate is de-radicalization; also, the definition either does not see or ignore radical freedom fighters, it sees them as non-radicals.

De-radicalization in Nigeria was aimed at contributing to a reduced level of violent extremism and terrorism via safe and evidence based de-radicalization intervention aimed at de-radicalizing Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) domiciled in various prisons in Nigeria (Ngwa, 2020). Looking at Nigeria's situation, the Delegation of the European Union to Nigeria and ECOWAS (DEUNE)'s perspective is relevant but the challenge is that not

all the radicalized individuals have violent views. Nigeria, however, has many radical fighters that go against the Nigerian government with a view to getting equality or improved services that either affect them or affect Nigeria as a nation. Examples are Omoyele Sowore, the founder and publisher of the renown online news medium, Sahara Reporters, Comrade Deji Adeyanju, Kadaria Ahmed amongst other prominent people, who are all publicly fighting the government via protests, rallies and demonstrations. But none of them is proven to be carrying arms (Thompson, Ojukwu & Nwaorgu, 2016; Ngwa, 2020).

### **Terrorism and Insurgencies**

There is a wider view of terrorism by several scholars. Some definitions are elaborate while some are vague. Terrorism is a systematic use of illegitimate violence as means of achieving some political objectives (Wallis, 2019). Terrorism is also considered as one of the most important words of vocabulary these days (Shafa, 2018). Terrorism is one of the biggest challenges to global peace and security (Ibrahim, 2019). Due to the changing nature of strategies used by terrorists across the globe, there are several methods of conducting acts of terrorism. Therefore, there are no universally acceptable definitions for such a type of crime (Shafa, 2018). In achieving their aims, terrorists use explosive devices, surface to air missiles, shooting at close quarter attacks, kidnappings, use of chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) devices (Oladimeji, 2019).

The way and manner terrorists use new methods to launch attacks and spread their ideologies and the different legal frameworks across different countries make it difficult to give comprehensive types of terrorism. There are several types of terrorism which include; Criminal Terrorism; Dissident Terrorism; Terrorists and the Left and Right; State Sponsored Terrorism and, Religious Terrorism (Oladimeji, 2019).

**Criminal Terrorism:** This is where the terrorists act for criminal gain or profit. The gain could be for the terror or the group he or she represents. The gain could be financial gain or unquantifiable gain such as to gain popularity, distract people or gain government's attention.

**State Sponsored Terrorism:** This terrorism is where government directly or indirectly sponsor or support terrorism. There have been claims that the US Government supports some non-state actors against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

**Dissident Terrorism:** This is a form of terrorism where the group goes against their legitimate government. An example is Boko Haram in Nigeria. They fight against the legitimate government in Nigeria to create their own Islamic state.

**Terrorists and the Left and Right:** These are terrorist groups which are motivated by their political ideologies. They use all sorts of force to intimidate the government or the society.

**Religious Terrorism:** This terrorism is carried out based on religious motives, beliefs and ideologies. The objectives and goals are all influenced by religious beliefs. An example of terrorist groups that connotes with religious terrorism is Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram.

**Ideological Terrorism:** This is motivated by political and ideological system of belief.

**International Terrorism:** This is the type that cut across various countries of terrorists' interest. Similarly, there is Trans-National Terrorism, which operates in one country but sometimes expand and operate 'beyond its territory (Bilgin 2019).

### **Previous Empirical Studies**

Rizwan, Batool and Khan (2022) critically analyzed the De-radicalization program in Muslim countries. The

findings of the study showed that Muslims have faced extremism and terrorism in many forms due to religious intolerance, economic crisis, and hatred. Some of the Muslim countries have launched de-radicalization programs to neutralize the views of extremism and to maintain peace in society. The study critically analyzes the steps taken by Muslim states to de-radicalize that including the process of De-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration. This study suggests education should be made compulsory for everyone. More infrastructure should be made for educational institutes because the lack of education leads towards extremism and radicalization. Information technology should be promoted as it is the need for recent times. In some occasions, correct religious instruction, including modest sacred understanding through verification of Quranic text and discussion on jihad, must be invigorated. More emphasis should be put on tolerance. The program desires to deliver persons with the tools to authenticate the information for them and rethink about their personal opinions and perspectives.

Erlangga, Edy, Retno, David and Ontra (2022) investigated correctional institutions as a place of guidance to counter radicalism for terrorist prisoners in Indonesia. This study uses the research method that is juridical normative by collecting primary data and secondary data. The findings of the study revealed that correctional institutions are at the forefront of de-radicalizing terrorism convicts to be ready to return to society. So that in the implementation of effective deradicalization required the participation of correctional institutions, relevant state institutions, and inmates. The study also recommends that correctional institution in collaboration with BNPT and other institutions synergize with each other to deradicalize and relate terrorism convicts so that they can analyze policies and approaches, identify dilemmas, and create road maps while finding new ideas in countering radicalization and returning terrorist convicts to society.

Okon, Williams, and Okeke (2021) evaluated the variables which promote and sustain primordial groups' identities and their linkages to the emergence and sustenance of terrorist groups in Nigeria. Grounded in the pluralist theory of sovereignty, the study adopts historical research design. It relies solely on data from secondary sources, which are presented qualitatively, and the finding is analyzed using content analysis techniques. The study reveals that the promotion of primordial identities above national identity for political advantage by the political elites leads to state bastardisation in Nigeria. Besides, it identifies the apostolical promotion of some neoliberal values without corresponding citizenship education, as responsible for the emergence of Boko Haram and other such groups that challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Nigerian state. It also questions the continuous promotion of religion in the public domain in a secular state and concludes that genuine integration policy is an urgent imperative. The study recommends that ethno-religious politics be buried; religion should be returned to the private lives of the citizenry. Besides, citizenship education and societal development should be prioritized in order to strengthen the state, and weaken the capacity of primordial groups to challenge the Nigerian State with violent outbursts.

Onapajo and Uzodike (2020) examined the de-radicalization program of the Nigerian government towards countering Boko Haram. It is argued that the design and implementation of the program have structural weaknesses that may further contribute to the problem of violent extremism. The study concluded that the de-radicalization program constitutes a part of the Boko Haram phenomenon which has not received attention in the scholarly arena. Therefore, the study recommended that the deradicalization program should include measures to ensure that individuals who have truly undergone rehabilitation are successfully reintegrated into the society. The purpose of the program is defeated if there is no successful reintegration after both the former combatants and victims of the terrorist group have undergone processes of deradicalization at various camps.

Zil-E-Huma Rafique and Mughees Ahmed, (2017) studied de-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts analysis of anti-terrorism activities in Pakistan. All the terrorists cannot be killed, captured or locked up indefinitely to prevent them from pursuing the life of a terrorist. In such an atmosphere de-radicalization and rehabilitation programmes assume supreme importance. The study suggested that rehabilitation programmes need time and

coordination from all concerned parties in an integrated and disciplined manner. There is a need to convince politicians and stakeholders so as to enhance the implementation of these programs. There are also other factors that need to be developed, Such as the provision of legal basis for the programs, financial support and inter-agency approach.

### **Theoretical Review**

This research adopted the frustration-aggression model theory. The theory was developed by John Dollard and associates in 1939 and was expanded and modified by Yate and Berkowitz (Dongel, 2015), drawing mainly from the psychological basis of motivation and behaviour. The theoretical framework provides explanations for violent behavioural disposition resulting from the inability of a people to fulfill their human needs (Ararile, 2019).

Moreover, the theory is based on the general premise that all humans have basic needs which they seek to fulfill and that any blockade to the fulfillment of these needs by individuals or groups elicit violent responses (Kregarman & P. Worchel, 1962). Frustration-Aggression theory emphasizes the differences between what people feel they want and the discrepancy, however marginal, between what is sought and what they get, the greater the violent reaction. In the face of these frustrated expectations, a group is most vulnerable to embark on violent destructive behaviour or be a ready army to be used to cause a crisis.

Miller (Miller, et al., 1942) and Sears (Sears, 1941) modified the concept two years later, saying that while irritation produces an urge to respond, aggressiveness is one possible effect. As a result, the revised theory asserted that, while dissatisfaction may or may not initiate aggressive conduct, any violent behavior is the outcome of frustration, making despair a necessary but not sufficient condition for aggressiveness.

The theory offers an attempt to understand the roots of violence (Dollard; Miller, Doob, Mowrer & Sears, 1939) Frustration, according to Dollard and colleagues, is the "condition that exists when a goal-response is impeded," whereas aggression is described as "an act whose goal-response is injury to a creature (or an organism surrogate)." According to the theory, dissatisfaction causes violence, but when the root of the irritation isn't addressed, the aggressiveness is directed against an innocent target. For example, if a man is abused and ridiculed at work but is unable to reply because he is frightened of losing his job, he may go home and unload his anger on his family. This theory is also used to describe riots and uprisings, both of which are assumed to be caused by poorer and more impoverished parts of society who may use violence to vent their bottled-up frustration and rage (Gregg, 2001). Central to this explanation is that aggression is the natural outcome of frustration. In a situation where the legitimate desires of an individual or group is denied either directly or by the indirect consequences of the way a society is structured, the feeling of frustration can compel such persons or group to express their anger through violence that is directed at those perceived to be responsible for their misfortune or others who are indirectly related to those frustrating their expectations.

### **Methodology**

The survey research design was adopted in this study. A survey is a type of research that involves gathering data from a predetermined group of people in order to get knowledge and insights about a variety of issues (Oyedokun, 2020). The main instruments used in the process of conducting the survey are questionnaire and in-depth interview. This study made use of a cross-sectional survey because respondents that were selected come from different economic, social and political backgrounds. The population of this research comprises male and female repentant members of the Boko Haram sect who are undergoing de-radicalization programmes. The sample size for this study was (100) repentant Boko Haram members who are undergoing de-radicalization. This number was determined by the amount of the respondents who were available and willing to participate in this study. The sampling technique adopted for the study of non-probability techniques. Statistical Package for social sciences (SPSS) was used for analyzing data obtained in the course of the study.

### **Analysis and Data Presentation**

**Table 1: Presentation of Demographic Information**

Variables	Characteristics	Frequency	Percentage
<b>Gender</b>	Male	82	89.1
	Female	10	10.9
	<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Age</b>	Below 25 years	44	47.8
	26-30 years	26	28.3
	31-40 years	19	20.7
	above40 years	3	3.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Marital status</b>	Single	68	73.9
	Married	18	19.6
	Divorced	6	6.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Educational Qualification</b>			
	Educated	17	18.5
	Uneducated	75	81.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Active number of years as Boko haram recruit</b>	Below 5 years	9	9.8
	5 and 10 year	55	59.8
	10 year and above years	28	30.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2022*

The analysis from Table 1 has shown that 82 (89.1%) of the respondents indicated that they are males, while 10 (10.9%) of the respondents indicated that they are females. The table illustrated that 44 (47.8%) of the respondents indicated that they are below the age of 25. 26 (28.3%) of the respondents indicated that they are between the ages of twenty-five to thirty years. 19 (20.7%) of the respondents indicated that they are between the ages of thirty-one and forty years, while 3 (3.3%) of the respondents indicated that they are above the age forty. Also, the findings showed that 68 (73.9%) of the respondents indicated that they are single, 18 (19.6%) of the respondents indicated that they are married, while 6 (6.5%) of the respondents indicated that they are divorced. Also from the analysis 17 (18.5%) of the respondents indicated that they are educated, while 75 (81.5%) of the respondents indicated that they are uneducated. While, 9 (9.8%) of the respondents indicated that they are below the age of five 55 (59.8%) of the respondents indicated that they are between the ages of five and ten years, while 28 (30.4%) of the respondents indicated that they are between the ages of ten years and above.

**Research Question 1:** What is the philosophy of de-radicalization?

Regarding clarity on the philosophy of de-radicalization, it shows that de-radicalization has to do with the idea that the people that have been indoctrinated in certain destructive beliefs and ideologies can be rehabilitated and reintegrated back into the society. However, the practical aspect of de-radicalization has been sketchy.

In a response by one of the interviewees: *They screened us and told us they were going to take us to Gombe for*

*skill acquisition but when we reached Gombe, for the whole ten months, early in the morning, they opened the cell and we started running. After we run, we come back and they lock us again, for the whole ten months. This is what we were doing. We didn't do anything". At the end of the 10 month program, all they gave me was carpentry tools. They didn't train us on how to use them. The tools is useless to me because I cannot do anything with them"*

Another interviewee affirmed what the first interviewee said, stating that: "They told us we were going to Gombe for skill acquisition but all we did was run every day and we were hardly fed and we went hungry most of the time".

In terms of follow up, the interviewees stated that "No one called him since he left the skill acquisition camp". The foregoing shows that the philosophy of de-radicalization is yet to gain ground in terms of practice

**Research Question 2:** How receptive is the society to the philosophy of de-radicalization?

**Table 2:** The acceptance of the philosophy of de-radicalization of repentant Boko Haram terrorists by the society

Statements	SA (%)	A (%)	N (%)	D (%)	SD (%)
There is growing acceptance of de-radicalization in the society	16 (17.4)	13 (14.1)	13 (14.1)	15 (16.3)	35 (38.0)
People can forgive repents with time if there is evidence of change in behaviour	42 (45.7)	10 (10.9)	27 (29.3)	5 (5.4)	8 (8.7)
Government success in campaign for social acceptance of de-radicalization process	16 (17.4)	13 (14.1)	13 (14.1)	16 (17.4)	34 (37.0)
The government makes adequate reparation and compensation to victims	15 (16.3)	19 (20.7)	9 (9.8)	14 (15.2)	35 (38.0)

*Source: Field Survey, 2022*

Analysis from table 2 indicated that 54.3% of the respondents disagreed that there is growing acceptance of de-radicalization in society. A total of 56.6% of the respondents agreed that people can forgive repents with time if there is evidence of change in behavior. However, 52.4% of the total respondents disagreed that the government has been successful in campaigning for social acceptance of the de-radicalization process. Also, 53.2% of the respondents are of the opinion that the government does not make adequate preparation and compensation to the victims.

**Research Question 3:** What are the effects of de-radicalization on the threat of radicalization in Nigeria?

**Table 3: The effect of de-radicalization on the threat of radicalization in Nigeria**

Statements	SA (%)	A (%)	N (%)	D (%)	SD (%)
Effectiveness of rehabilitation and reintegration programs	13 (14.1)	13 (14.1)	8 (8.7)	18 (19.6)	40 (43.5)
Possibility of people joining Boko Haram for de-radicalization program	44 (47.8)	16 (17.4)	10 (10.9)	12 (13.0)	10 (10.9)
De-radicalization program in Nigeria takes account of the social and psychological roots of boko haram recruitment	12 (13.0)	12 (13.0)	10 (10.9)	18 (19.6)	40 (43.5)

*Source: Field Survey, 2022*

Analysis from table 2 shows that a total of 63.1% of the respondents disagreed that the de-radicalization program for rehabilitation and reintegration of Boko haram has been effective. A total of 65.2% confirmed that there is a possibility of people joining Boko haram for the de-radicalization program. While 63.1% of the respondent disagreed that the de-radicalization program in Nigeria takes account of the social and psychological roots of Boko Haram recruitment.

### **Discussion of Findings**

De-radicalization is a process of causing a person with an extreme view to adopt more moderate positions regarding any issue. The first objective clarified the philosophy of de-radicalization and it revealed that de-radicalization has to do with the idea that the people that have been indoctrinated in certain destructive beliefs and ideologies can be rehabilitated and reintegrate back into the society.

On the second objective, the findings revealed that people can forgive repentant Boko Haram members with time if there is evidence of change in behavior. However, there is no growing acceptance of de-radicalized members of Boko haram in the society. This shows that even though the idea of reintegration sounds practicable, the implementation is challenging as the people of the communities find it hard to forgive and accept, knowing that the repentant Boko Haram members are the cause of the misery they experienced over the years. The study also revealed that the government has not been successful in campaigning for social acceptance of the de-radicalization process. Also, that government does not make adequate preparation and compensation to the victims.

From the third objective of the study which is to determine the effect of de-radicalization on the threat of radicalization in Nigeria, the results showed that the de-radicalization program for the rehabilitation and reintegration of Boko haram members have not been effective. Also, the findings revealed that there are possibilities of people joining Boko Haram for de-radicalization program. However, the de-radicalization program in Nigeria does not take account of the social and psychological roots of Boko haram recruitment.

Government de-radicalization operations have the potential to be extremely beneficial to the government if they are successful. A successful programme can produce valuable intelligence and evidence against active terrorist groups, encourage previously dangerous individuals to stay away from terrorism and radical organisations, and disengage individuals to serve reduced sentences for crimes committed (thereby lowering the costs associated with prison overcrowding). Another advantage of the programmes is that they enable those who have renounced their involvement in violent extremism to publicly distance themselves from the causes they once backed, undermining the support and legitimacy of the organizations. They also enable those who have done so to meet victims of violence and even ask for their forgiveness. Due to the benefits of de-radicalization as well as the government's sincerity in ensuring that the programmes for de-radicalization are successfully carried out and the structures that support radicalization are abolished, this will deter radicalization. However, this is not the case with de-radicalization programs in Nigeria.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

De-radicalization philosophy as shown in the study is about the idea of rehabilitation and reintegrating radicalized people back into the society. Even though Nigeria has adopted de-radicalization as a strategy in combination with military action, there are issues affecting its implementation. As shown in the study, there is low confidence of the public among the efficacy of the de-radicalization strategies of the government as being implemented. However, they still believe that de-radicalization is a better approach than military action. An area that is key to success to De-radicalization but which has not been fully harnessed is forgiveness and acceptances of the repentant members of Boko Haram by members of the communities that they are going to be reintegrated into.

The de-radicalization strategies are being carried out without detailed feedback from members of the communities on the conditions they want before accepting repentant Boko Haram members back into the communities. Moreover, the risk of recidivism and re-engagement is strong. The reason for this cannot be dissociated from the aforementioned issues identified and the fact that the timeframe for rehabilitation and reintegration is too short for full de-radicalization. The possibility of recidivism and re-engagement is further enhanced by the fact that nothing is really thought of in the skill acquisition camps as the repentant Boko Haram members are merely given tools without support to create their business and source customers. There is also lack of follow up on the progress and challenges that the rehabilitated insurgents face in the process of reintegration. The foregoing challenges show that more still need to be done for de-radicalization strategies to be successful in the country.

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made:

- i. Transitional justice is vital to de-radicalization. This means that there is a need for greater involvement of people in the communities in the de-radicalization process. A greater understanding of soft approach to counter-terrorism will lead to greater acceptance by people of the community.
- ii. Competence of trainers in the skill acquisition centers should be prioritized. This is because of the complaints by the repentant members of the sect that they are not trained at all.
- iii. There is a need for an improved vetting process for repentant members of the sect to understand their willingness and readiness to go beyond just surrendering and accepting to truly go through deradicalization and rehabilitation process.

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