Dynamism of Third-Party Intervention in Sudan's First Civil War, 1956-1972

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Abstract

One of the greatest problems confronting Africa today is the increasing rate of armed conflicts. These crises are complex and predominantly intra-state. Some of the factors responsible for the crises are political violence, economic deprivation and exclusion, injustice, primordial sentiments of ethnicity, regionalism and religious differences. The immediate consequences of these conflicts have been threat not only to social cohesion and internal stability of individual countries but also total economic collapse, decline of social values, and survival of the entire society. This paper, therefore, examines the indigenous mechanisms used in 1972 to resolve the Sudanese first civil war in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This should serve as a lesson in the resolution of other African conflicts and encourage them to channel the resources used to execute wars for the development of the continent. In the presentation and analysis of data, the study adopted the content analysis approach where data from different sources were carefully evaluated to establish the facts regarding the dynamism of third-party intervention in Sudanese first civil war 1956-1972.

Keywords: Third Party, Intervention, Conflict, Sudanese, Indigenous

Introduction

A survey of Africa's civil wars within the period, 1960-1993, reveals that there have been no less than 20 full-fledged armed conflicts across the continent. A more recent survey showed that, between 2002 and 2006, there were more than twelve civil conflicts in Africa within a four-year period. This is, indeed, a disturbing development, viewed from the angle of consequences of armed confrontations. Series of conferences have been held to fine-tune the modalities to curb the advancement of terrorism in the continent. UNHCR (1993), rightly captured the picture when it observed that "Africa's refugees are estimated to be 5.2 million while internally displaced person over 10 million.

Various scholars have pointed out that communal and mass civil conflicts have been a prominent feature of many developing countries since their formal political independence. In Africa, for example, Richard and Pieriuseppe (2011) asserts that conflicts threatened to split states like Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Western Sahara, Ethiopia, Liberia, Angola, to mention a few. Some of these scholars have also pondered over the nature, sources, forms and character of conflicts in society in general. This paper, however, focuses on Sudan.

Sources of Conflicts in Sudan

The Sudanese war is very complex and multidimensional. Alliances were made and unmade. All sides practiced a policy of DIVID-AND-RULE and abuse of human rights. Zelaza (2001) and some scholars argued that the war is better comprehended as a number of interlocking civil conflicts, in which southerner were set against southerner and northerner against northerner as well as northerner against southerner. However, there is one constraining issue which underlies the conflict and the earlier civil war which began before independence in the1956 and ended in 1972.

This is *casus belli* the enduring economic and cultural gap between the Muslim, Arab inhabitants of the central, river provinces, whose elites have controlled the state since independence and the non-Arab, who are largely non-Muslim peoples of the south-of which the Nuer and the Dinka are two major tribes among many. Northerners have consistently discriminated against southerners on grounds of ethnicity and religion. The southern region has been marginalized in economic, political and infrastructural developments. Other parts of Sudan have also suffered this hegemony of the centre-notably the western provinces (the majority of whose

inhabitants are Muslim but not Arab). However, it is the southerners who have suffered most. Thus, it was southerners who, from 1956 and again in the 1983 took up arms against the government in Khartoum.

The war is not just about control of resources or access to state power, argued y Mohammed (1974) that even though these are important factors; the conflict is centered on the nature of the state itself. The ruling elites in Khartoum view Sudan as a Muslim country and an integral part of the Arab world. Their counterparts southerners see the society as multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state, one in which Arabs (though not Muslims) are a minority in the state. Today, many southerners embrace a more radical solution to resolve the conflict. They see the establishment of a separate southern state as the only solution to this seemingly intractable divergence of views. This notion is implacably opposed by most northern Sudanese and by nearly all neighboring countries, particularly Egypt.

LeRiche (2012) asserts that the main cause of this conflict is the widespread feeling of being consistently socio-economically marginalized, the context of self-determination and power-sharing *cum* border demarcations in Abiyei. By early 2003, exiled Sudanese rights activists claimed that the conflict in western Sudan's Darfur region was developing from ethnic cleansing into genocide. The Khartoum government allegedly supported Arabs militias in their massacre of and other indigenous people termed "slaves". Khartoum, however; claimed its neutrality and claimed it as fighting "banditry" in Darfur region.

Zelaza (2001) further argued that the UN estimates that up to 1, 600,000 people had been displaced by the conflict since February 2000. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to flee their homes since fighting broke out in April 2003 between the rebel Justice and Equality Movement and government forces. The situation of women and children is worrisome.

Nature of Conflict Management in Africa

The existing literature on conflict management in Africa demonstrates three predispositions. (1) legalist (2) realist and (3) humanitarian approaches. In their analyses of conflict management, organizations in Africa, such as the AU, or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), through the military monitoring group, ECOMOG, Inter-Governmental Authority on Draught (IGAD), which is a regional organization in East Africa all reflected either or a combination of the above paradigms. The first objective of the organization was to control the draught but when the need arise as a result of conflict ravaging the regional that galvanized it to begin to find lasting solution to the conflict. Therefore, the arm of the organization was established to control and resolved civil wars in East Africa in which South Sudan was the first country which it took off its mission on conflict resolution.

The legalist tradition e.g. Ayissi (1994) and Kwesi (2000) and legal institutional evolution focus on the arrangements of the regional and sub-regional organizations. Implicit in their arguments and analysis is that the success or failure of these third-party organizations in conflict management is dependent upon the structure adopted by the institutions. The current debate on the AU's protocol on politics, defense and security as well as the operationalization of the very recent Mutual Defence Pact signed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on 26th August 2003, would fall under this category. The legal structure and power afforded these organizations will affect their operational capacity to act in a conflict management role.

Second, there is a 'realist' school of thought, which demonstrates two sub-tendencies. For example, Somerville (1990) argues that third-party interventions by outside actors are determined by the structure of the international system and predicated on colonial or cold war issues. Other authors focus on the quest for power exhibited by certain African leaders as an explanation of third party involvements. Thus, analyses are illuminated by the realities on the ground, especially in the Great Lake/DRC region.

The humanitarian school is important in the literature on third-party involvement in African conflicts. This literature focuses among other things, on the externalities caused by the civil wars that ravage Africa, such as refugees, famines, epidemics and other elements of humanitarian catastrophes referred to as 'complex

humanitarian emergences[3]. Interestingly, White (1990) says that while the dilemmas and challenges for the international community responding to complex emergences are well argued, analysis on the causes of the conflicts giving rise to the complex humanitarian's emergences are ancillary.

Zartman (1986) further claims that the former regional Organisation, the organization for Africa Unity now the African Union – (AU) has a *de jure* conflict management role, favouring-unsurprisingly-peaceful conflict resolution. In 1993, it formally obtained UN support for the development of a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The mechanism functions on the basis of consent and cooperation of parties involved in the conflict and as such maintain AU principles for peaceful settlement of disputes. The 1994 slaughter in Rwanda, however, prompted some AU member countries to push for the organisation to take a more active role in peacekeeping. There has since been talk on the establishment of standby military contingents, finance at large part by the European Union, which could be used by the UN and African Union in times of crises.

West Africa has had a sub-regional organization ECOWAS, since 1975. The 15 member states created the organisation in order to promote a more integrated economic market, but a conflict management function was added when ECOWAS responded to the civil war in Liberia by creating ECOMOG in 1990. While in principles a non-standing military force, since the Liberian Civil War, ECOMOG FORCE has also been redeployed to Sierra-Leone and Guinea-Bissau. It has since formed the basis of a regional conflict peacekeeping mechanism, becoming involved in the civil conflict in Ivory Coast in 2002 and subsequently to Liberia. Senegal and Nigeria are two states that are relatively powerful, in comparison with their neighbours, that have shown strong interest in regional political affairs and intervention. Moreover, they not only have the potential to intervene in any phase of conflict, they can also become involved separately, together and at different times.

Forms of Third-Party Intervention in International Conflicts
The link between issues and conflict-proneness is well established in this paper. Therefore, once the decision to intervene has been made, another question of interest is who are the third party interveners, and what forms or patterns should they follow? Essentially, to analyze third party interventions either according to (1) the method of intervention, along "militarized" versus non-militarized dimensions, and (2) the nature of the intervener; whether the intervener was the "international community" or a unilateral actor, whereby it appears "state-centric."
These concepts are not easily reduced to simple dichotomies. First, it is that third-party interveners are either multi-national coalitions or individual states. Second, it is that when states intervene unilaterally it is because they are those with interests and power. Almost a generation ago, Regan (2002) found that the superpowers did not use "proxies" to fight their wars in the Third-World. At least, not as much as was speculated; they did a lot of work themselves. Indeed, the concept of intervention is limited to the operationalisation proposed earlier, much of the chatters that emanate from the verbal "interveners" and the list of active interveners is reduced to those that can actually affect the course of events in a distant conflict.

In this vein, Jacob Ercovitch (1991) analyses third-party interventions in Latin American international crises. They found out that the United States is the most 'actively' involved third-party intervener a crisis actor, and in many cases a party to the dispute. The UN is the second most active organ but the least effective in terms of conflict abatement in comparison to the Organisaton of American states (OAS). Moreover, while the vast majority of Latin American states prefer RED to involve the OAS and manage their conflict regionally, the communist states of Cuba and Nicaragua always rejected this body as illegitimate and preferred to involve the UN, where they found allies in the then soviet bloc. Therefore, the forms of third party interventions and the identity of the intervener will be affected the identity of the belligerents and their political interests and world-view. In view of this political reality, a global conflict management policy will not advance without first tackling these regional interests and polities.

Adebayo (2002) argued that, in extending the same threat to conflicts in Africa, we could hypothesize along the same lines that African states with interests and power would be the most likely to want to affect the duration and outcome of regional conflicts occurring in their "backyard" according to their interests; otherwise, regional organizations would be preferred, since powerful states can still at least influence decision-making in these organizations. The UN would be called upon as either as the conflict commenced a last resort or by regional actors who feel their interest are not adequately represented in the regional bodies.

The Addis Ababa Agreement Of 1972
The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which was signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Anya Nya Movement, led to the end of the first civil war. As noted already, this agreement derived from the Round Table Conference of 1965 after a 12-man committee recommended visible steps on how the conflict could be resolved and complete peace and security restored in the country. The signing of the agreement was witnessed by the following reputable personnel and organisations: World Council of Churches, Sudan Council of Churches and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. Accordingly, J.A. Biswaro said Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia represented Organisation of African Unity during the signing. The Addis Ababa Agreement spelt out the powers and limitations of regional autonomy for Southern Sudan. Article 11 outlined the powers while Article 7 outlined the limitations.

Powers of Regional Autonomy
Breidlid (2014) mentions that the People's Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, interim security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, economic and social fields and in particular, in the following areas:
   a. Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration of the Southern Region.
   b. Organisation of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.
   c. Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.
   d. Establishment, maintenance and administration of persons and reformatory institutions.
   e. Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public schools at all levels in accordance with National Plans for education and economic and social development.
   f. Provision for local languages and cultures.
   g. Towns and villages planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and programmes.
   h. Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders' licences and formation of co-operation societies.
   i. Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.
   j. Administration of environmental health services; maternity care, child welfare; supervision of markets; combat of epidemic diseases, training of medical assistants and rural midwives; establishment of health centre, dispensaries, and dressing stations.
   k. Promotion of animal health; control of epidemic and improvement of animal production and trade.
   l. Promotion of tourism.
   m. Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organisations of trade and cultural exhibitions.
   n. Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.
   o. Recruitment for organisation and administration of police and Prison services in accordance with the national policy and standards.
   p. Land use in accordance with national laws.
   q. Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.
   r. Development, utilisation, and protection of forests crops and pastures in accordance with national laws.
   s. Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.
   t. All other matters delegated by the President or the People's National Assembly for legislation.

Limitations of the Regional Autonomy (Chapter IV, Article 7):
Neither the People's Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or exercise any power on matters of national nature which are:
  a. National Defence.
  b. External Affairs.
  c. Currency and Coinage.
  d. Air and Inter-Regional Transport.
  e. Communication and Telecommunications.
  f. Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities, which the Regional Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
  g. Nationality and Immigration (Emigration).
  h. Planning for Economic and Social Development.
  i. Educational Planning.
  j. Public Audit.

In conclusion, the third party involvement can be of varying levels and take different forms such as:
  - Discussion of the problem in international or bilateral forums.
  - Fact-finding, which involves as inquiry by a third party as to the facts surrounding a conflict.
  - Good offices, where a third party helps the parties to the direct negotiations and has minimal involvement in both the content and the process of resolving a dispute.
  - Condemnation, which includes an implied or explicit demand to desists from hostile activities, and a request for aid to the victims of hostile activity by the third party.
  - A "call for action" by adversaries includes a call for cease fire, troops withdrawal, negotiation, and action to facilitate termination by the third party;
  - Mediation or conciliation which involves a third party that actively participates in the settlement process. Mediation is generally constituted by a single third party, while in conciliation there may be a conciliatory commission. In both cases their aim is to propose an acceptable solution for the parties to a conflict.
  - Arbitration, which is a legalistic form of conflict resolution where the contestants select a third party who makes a judgment on the case. There is a formal binding settlement by an arbitration body, thus distinguishing it from mediation and conciliation.
  - Sanctions, which may include the complete or partial interruption of economic or political relation of economic or political relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, radio, and other means of communication are measure that often do not involve the use of armed forced employed to make effective the decisions reached by international organisations.
  - Peacekeeping or military intervention by emergency military forces, whose primary task is to encourage conformity among the parties to a cease-fire or armistice methods include interposition (stationing troops between the forces of the disputants) and surveillance.

Conclusion
The Sudanese conflict is a peculiar one. This is because it destroyed the country and had negative impacts on neighboring countries. It became an issue of immense concerns for United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, it is a glaring fact that the first Sudanese civil war was resolved via African indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in Addis Ababa Agreements in 1972.

It should be noted that conflict is endemic wherever human beings co-exist and can become pandemic if not quickly resolved. Various scholars have postulated theories on how conflicts can be resolved. In the case of the first Sudanese civil war, 1956-1972, the resolution came as a result of Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 when all the parties involved met in Ethiopia and signed an agreement under the watchful eyes of OAU representatives and actors from both the North and South of Sudan. The document assigned and granted some autonomy to

South Sudan. This was what led to the end of the first civil war and the country had relative peace for a period of ten years before the second civil war broke out in 1983 when North Sudan did not keep to its bargains in the agreement. The beauty of the resolution of the first Sudanese crisis is the established fact that Africans solution was used to resolved African problems. This remains a lesson for Africa in its determined effort to resolve continental conflicts. Western theorizing has precluded the ability of African countries from resolving their own crises without external intervention. However, deduction from the resolution of the Sudanese Crises of has debunked this illusion. The uniqueness of the African society makes it uniquely positioned to resolve its own crisis. There is a need for further studies on the traditional conflict resolution mechanism as a panacea to resolving crisis in Africa.

Recommendations

In the light of the above, the paper recommends or suggests the following for improvement:

1. African leaders should have more political will and commitments in solving African problems.
2. African Union and other sub-regional organizations should develop the required capacity to enhance its operations, particularly in the areas of finances and trained personnel.
3. African Union should develop a good and functional Early Warning System and Early Response Capacity before conflicts turn into full blown war.
4. Lastly, African leaders should purge itself of corruption and their hegemonic tendencies.

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